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as well as Russian foreign and security policy and defense reform. Her . war in former. Yugoslavia was the first test of Russia's post-Soviet diplomacy. Many.
Table of contents
- Israel’s Camero networks sense-though-wall radars to mount on unmanned platforms
- Foreign relations of the Soviet Union
- Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion
- Kosovo, NATO and Russia in: The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
James Hughes London School of Economics. Pages Published online: 06 Jun Article Metrics Views. Article metrics information Disclaimer for citing articles. Login options Log in. Username Password Forgot password? Shibboleth OpenAthens. Restore content access Restore content access for purchases made as guest. Article Purchase - Online Checkout.
Issue Purchase - Online Checkout. The plan called for the ethnic division of Bosnia into seven to ten largely autonomous cantons based on near-absolute ethnic majorities under a loose central government, urged the UN Security Council to reduce economic resources available to Serbia via a total trade embargo, induced NATO enforcement of the peace with air and naval power and raised the taboo issue of the autonomous areas of Yugoslavia including Kosovo.
With Yugoslavia having so cruelly defied its peacemaking endeavors, the EC temporarily disengaged from the Balkans to reevaluate the meaning of collective European security and reassess foreseeable future threats. Beset by economic stagnation and the difficult conversion from collective industrial to private individualized service economies, an increasingly diverse and reideologized EC jettisoned the predominant fixation on collective trans-Atlantic security in favor of the more urgent economic rivalry emanating from NAFTA and the Pacific Rim.
The Treaty of Rome did not encompass the thorny issues of defense, security, or foreign policy, as the Community was not to be constituted solely by formal treaties but rather to be located within a wider political environment in which popular aspiration to political integration and even union with common foreign and defense policies would occur as part of an evolutionary process.
Although to these ends TEU purported to expand the coordination of foreign policy by permitting the European Council to set guidelines enabling the Council of Ministers to take foreign policy decisions on matters that should be subject to joint action on a qualified majority rather than a unanimity basis, under Article J.
Israel’s Camero networks sense-though-wall radars to mount on unmanned platforms
EC members, as a practical matter, still were unwilling to collectively slip from the U. With the U. Although rumors of genocide, mass rape, and systematic torture appeared in the investigations of both the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and human rights groups, politically-motivated parties on both sides of the Atlantic countered reports of bestiality with cavalier suggestions that the peoples of the Balkans were fated, either by history or genetics, to engage in barbarous intercommunal conduct.
Via its capitulation, the EC abdicated its role in Yugoslavia and withdrew to attend to internal political triage. In turn, the UN grudgingly assumed responsibility for the mounting crisis. Although its delegates talked tough in its opening session by affirming the territorial independence of Bosnia and recognizing the legal right of self-defense, London devolved rapidly into a glorified photo opportunity.
In rewarding aggression and sacrificing all pretext to justice and legal legitimacy, EC rejectionism in the autumn of constituted the first major diplomatic turning point, the catalyst for intensified Serb butchery, and the swan song of any effective EC participation in the resolution of the genocidal wars in Yugoslavia.
In due course, on November 3, , the Bosnian Serb Parliament rejected in large measure the Vance-Owen Plan and withdrew from the First Geneva Ministerial Talks, believing it could achieve total victory on the field of battle without recourse to Vance-Owen.
Reacting to the carnage that followed the willful abandonment of the last diplomatic efforts in , CSCE at its Stockholm Meeting could only issue an anguished but hollow plea for the end to the war in Bosnia and the maintenance of its sovereignty and territorial integrity. By the end of , those on both sides of the Atlantic who believed Bosnia and Western credibility could be saved only if the U.
However, President-elect Clinton and his nominees for post on his foreign policy team soon dashed hopes for U. In December , Clinton not only contemplated total U. Clinton also concluded, in the absence of an international consensus on what precisely to do with Bosnia, a peripheral U.
Foreign relations of the Soviet Union
Consequently, the EC and its foreign policy and security institutions, rather than the U. Although the addition of neutrals Austria, Finland, and Sweden introduced potential monetary and geostrategic resources with which to assist development of an EU CFSP, by downplaying the military dimension of foreign policy and emphasizing economic and cooperative approaches to security in its stead, the enigmatic Euroneutrals placed a stumbling block in the path of the post-Petersberg development of ESDI and of the WEU as EU defense arm and further complicated the elusive search for an EU role in Yugoslavia.
With four of its fifteen members now controlling a bloc of fourteen votes and needing only twenty-six votes to defeat security-oriented resolutions on qualified majority voting, the as-yet inexperienced European Council was unable to effect the constructive abstention necessary for the Euroneutrals to avoid military commitments violative of their neutrality while at the same time permitting development of the WEU as the ESDI of the EU.
Although the U. However, the Clinton Administration was too hamstrung by economic difficulties and a perceived absence of compelling strategic interests to attempt to rally public support for intervention beyond the lift-and-strike proposal the Europeans rejected. On May 6, , the Bosnian Serb Assembly triumphantly rejected the conditional acceptance given four days previously by Radovan Karadzic of the Vance-Owen plan.
Despite the fresh framework the five-power grouping afforded for reconsideration of options and objectives, the U. Let it proclaim a new code of behavior in which force will be the first and the last argument. By the end of , with a quarter million dead and four million refugees, the WEU Assembly concluded that not only had the development of CFSP and ESDI been irreparably compromised, but the very viability of European aspirations to unity also had been sorely tested by the progression of the war in the Balkans. Despite the British and French acknowledgement in September that the U. This was.
The President provided no steady leadership. In November, the trans-Atlantic partnership sustained additional battering when the U. With the assumption of office by a Republican U. Congress in January , the eternal burden sharing debate reignited at a most inopportune time for the Atlantic Alliance.
Either international cohesion that included the increasingly obstructive Russians or the will of the West was required to end the war. The world watched as the resulting two-week U. The brief U. The tragedy of Bosnia illustrates that a reactive regional organizational approach to conflict management led by an internally divided, timid organization is predestined to failure. Furthermore, the absence of a credible warfighting capability in the EU made deterrence and intervention impossible irrespective of whether a CFSP on Bosnia had emerged.
Europe has acquired the capability to make its own contribution to a just and peaceful world order. Berlin made it clear that the U. So ordered, the WEU turned away from its technical muddling and diligently bent to actualizing its operational capabilities. By the end of the year, the debates within the European pillar centered upon whether the follow-on-force to IFOR, the stabilization force SFOR , would become a more European force along the lines of the CJTF and whether the EU quest to act consistently and coherently in international relations could ever overcome the clash of foreign policy cultures.
Although, in January , the U.
Threat or Threatened? Russian Foreign Policy in the Era of NATO Expansion
Even for adherents to the opposing multilateral institutional theory that the most important post-Bosnian project was building a European pillar at the continental level inclusive of the former Warsaw Pact states, Russia presented vehement objections to the expansion of NATO into the gray zone between Germany and the former Soviet frontiers.
Its expansion eastwards must mean a substantial shift in the balance of power with unmistakable military implications. On the expansionist course it had set in reaction to Bosnia and the failure of its European pillar, NATO seemed inexorably committed to drawing its members into one. Lukewarm European efforts to address the vacuum of purpose and power in collective Western security, however, fell short once again. WEU is an integral part of the development of the European Union, providing the Union with access to an operational capability, notably in the context of the Petersberg tasks, and is an essential element of the development of the European Security and Defense Identity within the Atlantic Alliance.
WEU will develop its role as the politico-military body for crisis management, contribute to the progressive framing of a common defense policy and carry forward its concrete implementation through the further development of its own operational role. Nevertheless, the discharge of the WEU responsibility to be the Western European crisis manager outside the territorial area covered by the Washington Treaty, as evidenced by Bosnia, remained grossly inadequate, and the WEU had complicated the policy vacuum by ceding all serious contemplation of collective defense to national governments and to the political institutions of the EU.
Demands that the WEU be allowed to die in peace mounted. While some might argue that, as a result of the lessons of Yugoslavia, Amsterdam was a successful attempt to integrate the WEU and EU, under closer inspection it is plain that Amsterdam failed to even attempt to reach a consensus on the relationship between the WEU and EU, as members still could opt out from participation in a CFSP action on the claim of a vital interest in Article J.
Amsterdam did not confer legal personality on the EU and, thus, may require separate ratification by each member to any agreement concluded by the European Council.
Kosovo, NATO and Russia in: The Kosovo crisis and the evolution of post-Cold War European security
Meanwhile, the Western Europeans, still with no functional CFSP and still unable to resolve pressing post-Cold War questions of how to adjudicate competing claims to sovereignty and self-determination within the internal boundaries of a multiethnic state, fell asleep on the watch as Kosovo, now the worst minority problem in Europe, tumbled into anarchy.
The territory of Kosovo is the cradle of the Serbian church, the birthplace of the medieval Serbian nation, and legally a province of the modern nation-state of Serbia following its cession from the Ottoman Empire. However, shifts in demographic patterns altered the political balance and, by the outbreak of World War I, ethnic Serbs were a minority in Kosovo, while Kosovar Albanian Muslims were a disenfranchised, subjugated majority.
As Yugoslavia moved to nip Kosovar Albanian nationalism in the bud, the situation in Kosovo swiftly deteriorated. Although international attention shifted to Bosnia for the next several years, by Kosovo once again was the foremost item on the Balkan agenda of Western collective security managers. On March 30 of that year, former U. Ambassador Warren Zimmerman endorsed the partition of Kosovo. Envoy to the Balkans Robert Gelbrand, simultaneously accusing Serb authorities of responsibility for the violence and rejecting independence for Kosovo and the demand from the EU that Yugoslavia restore provincial autonomy.
When a vicious JNA offensive on February 28, against the Kosovo Liberation Army KLA somehow caught the West by surprise and destroyed the nucleus of the Kosovar Albanian resistance, the Kosovar Albanian population was rendered ripe for yet another genocidal campaign at the hands of the regular army, paramilitaries, and civilian brigands.
By late summer, the desperate Kosovar Albanians won a major victory with the September 23, passage of UN Security Council Resolution that condemned those Yugoslav actions in Kosovo that were causing an enormous humanitarian disaster and that demanded that Yugoslavia cease its assaults on civilians.
- George F. Kennan - Wikipedia.
- KOSOVO AND THE CHALLENGE OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION.
- Issues and Recommendations.
- The structure and purpose of this book.
Although the failure of Resolution to explicitly mention that the use of force was the basis for a Russian vote in its favor, Yugoslavia acceded to Western demands for a cease-fire that briefly halted the humanitarian disaster. Nevertheless, by early October, Yugoslavia violated the cease-fire and sparked ethnic Albanian demands for Western humanitarian intervention. By October 15, the Kosovar Albanians had rejected a U. The principal reasons for the rejection were that the Hill Plan would have postponed discussion of the final status of Kosovo for three years, diluted the legal personality of Kosovo, and locked Kosovo into autonomy rather than independence, as its status could be modified only at the end of the three-year period with the consent of all parties.
Although Serbia indicated as a counteroffer that it was willing to accede to a reduction-in-forces agreement to levels existing prior to the February 28, offensive monitored not by the WEU but by two thousand unarmed civilian observers from the OSCE, Rugova proclaimed that NATO ground combat troops, in conjunction with the availability of NATO air strikes, were essential for enforcement of the cease-fire and protection of ethnic Albanians, while leaders of Kosovo Albanian nationalist parties rejected any deal outright.
On October 20, when no agreement based on the Hill Plan could be fashioned, a third major Serb offensive steamrolled across Kosovo. Irrespective of the merits of the Western claim that ongoing genocide and other widespread and systematic violations of human rights in Kosovo justified humanitarian intervention, military action was contraindicated in the absence of explicit UN Security Council authorization that clearly indicated the objectives and terminated with the establishment of a permanent cease-fire.
However, the U.